

FORELØBIG REDEGØRELSE

HCLJ300-000044	Hændelse		
Luftfartøj:	Canadair CL600-2B19	Registrering:	OY-RJC
Motorer:	2 GE CF34-3B1	Flyvning:	Kommerciel, IFR
Besætning:	4 – ingen tilskadekomst	Passagerer:	Ingen
Sted:	Oslo Lufthavn, Gardermoen, Norge	Dato og tidspunkt:	31.1.2008 kl. 1621 UTC

Hændelsen indtraf i norsk luftrum og udredes af den norske havarikommission.

Havarikommissionen for Civil Luftfart og Jernbane er tilknyttet undersøgelsen som akkrediteret repræsentant og bistår den norske havarikommission med sin assistance.

Den norske havarikommission har offentliggjort en foreløbig redegørelse for hændelsen, se nedenfor.

Serious Incident to Canadair CL600-2B19, OY-RJC at Oslo Airport Gardermoen on 31 January 2008 - Preliminary Report

Accident Investigation Board Norway
P.O. Box 213
NO-2001 Lillestrom
Phone: + 47 63 89 63 00
Fax: + 47 63 89 63 01
<http://www.aibn.no>
E-mail: post@aibn.no

Date: 15 Feb 2008
Reference: SL2008/01P
08/68 – 12

All times given in this report are local time (UTC + 1), unless otherwise stated.

Aircraft information:

- Type and reg.: Bombardier Inc. - Canadair CL600-2B19 (Series 100), OY-RJC
- Year of manufacturing: 1993
- Engines: 2 General Electric CF34-3B1 turbofan engines

Operator:

Cimber Air Denmark

Date and time:

Thursday 31 January 2008 at 1721 hrs

Location:

Take-off RWY 19L at Oslo Airport Gardermoen (ENGM), Norway

Type of occurrence:

Serious incident

Type of flight:

Commercial Air Transport (positioning flight)

Weather conditions:

METAR ENGM 1620 UTC: 15015kt 1700 SNRA SCT003
BKN006 OVC009 00/00 Q0981

Light conditions:

Darkness

No. of persons onboard:

Flight crew: 2
Cabin crew: 2

Injuries to persons:

None

Damage to aircraft:

None

Other damage:

None

Information sources:

AIBN initial investigation

History of the flight

The incident flight was a positioning flight from Oslo Airport Gardermoen, Norway (ENGM) to Copenhagen Airport Kastrup, Denmark (EKCH) with 2 flight crew members and 2 cabin crew members on board. Surface wind was from 150° at 15 kt, visibility 1 700 m in moderate snow/rain, temperature 0 °C. Braking action was reported medium, with 3 mm slush on the runway. The runway was sanded. The CRJ200 aircraft, OY-RJC, was de-iced and anti-iced at the platform close to threshold runway 19L. Due to wind, all aircraft were parked heading south during de-icing.

Fuselage treatment was considered unnecessary on OY-RJC, but wings and tail were treated from two vehicles, one on each side of the aircraft. Hot water was used for de-icing (step 1). Wing flap setting was then 45°. The person in charge of the de-icing has explained that he followed the normal procedures and did a hands-on check of the entire leading edge and upper wing surface at the wing

root on both wings to ensure that they were clean before application of anti-ice fluid (step 2). Flaps were retracted to 20° before final treatment started at 1706 hrs. Anti-ice fluid used was 100 % Type II+ (Clariant). Anti-icing was finished at 1711 hrs, and the aircraft left the de-icing platform. The flight crew then performed engine run-up, and at 1716 hrs OY-RJC was ready for take-off. They held short of the runway while a MD81 landed, and were cleared to line-up and wait on runway 19L at 1717 hrs. Take-off clearance was issued at 1720 hrs. The flight crew on the landing MD81 informed that braking action was poor.

The OY-RJC flight crew verified that the combination of braking action and crosswind component was within limits, and applied take-off thrust at 1721 hrs. This was 15 minutes after anti-ice was started and well within the established holdover time (HOT) in moderate snow. Flaps were 20°, and cowl anti-icing was selected ON prior to take-off. Wing anti-ice was unintentionally off during take-off. The calculated and briefed speeds for take-off are assessed to be appropriate based on the estimated mass of the aircraft (TOM 17 330 kg, V1: 109 kt; VR: 115 kt; V2: 126 kt).

Take-off roll was uneventful, and rotation was initiated at the calculated speed. Data from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), which has been successfully downloaded at AAIB (UK) laboratories at Farnborough, indicate that rotation was performed at a higher rate than recommended (6-7° per second instead of max 3°). Almost immediately after lift-off, the aircraft started an uncommanded right roll to an excessive bank angle. The stall protection system (SPS) stick shaker and stick pusher activated, and a combination of the SPS activation and flight crew actions resulted in a successful recovery of the aircraft. Gear was retracted and clean up performed at safe altitude. At this time, wing anti-ice was selected ON. Aircraft handling characteristics, flight controls and indications were all normal, and the flight continued to Copenhagen where it landed without further incident 55 minutes later.

Shortly after landing, the operator notified the Accident Investigation Board (AIB Denmark) of the serious incident. AIB Norway was informed, and is conducting the investigation as the State of occurrence. In accordance with the established international arrangements the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada, representing the State of Design and Manufacture of the aircraft, was notified of the event, and so was European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). TSB appointed an Accredited Representative, who is supported by advisors from Transport Canada (TC) and the aircraft manufacturer Bombardier.

The downloaded FDR information will be the subject to detailed analysis. Also detailed weather, de-icing and runway information is being collected for further analysis. The flight crew has been interviewed by AIBN in cooperation with AIB Denmark. Further investigation work will continue on technical, operational and environmental aspects.

Safety actions taken

The operator has stated that they, as a consequence of this serious incident, have briefed all their crew on the danger of excessive rates of rotation and stressed the importance of correct technique.

Bombardier has issued an All Operator Message on the subject Operational Take-off Safety, referring to this serious incident.

This investigation is ongoing. AIBN will publish a full report when the investigation has been completed. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Updated preliminary information or safety recommendations will be issued at any stage of the investigation if deemed necessary for air safety.

Yderligere information eller spørgsmål skal rettes til den norske havarikommission.

Statens Havarikommisjon for Transport

Sophie Radichs vei 17

2001 Lillestrøm

Norge

Telefon: +47 63 89 63 00

Fax: +47 63 89 63 01

E-mail: post@aibn.no

Webside: www.aibn.no