

Information Bulletin Number 26/2005

TO : All U.A.E. B737 Operators
FROM : Director Aviation Safety and Security
REF. : 20212/5258
DATE : Sunday 30th, October 2005
SUBJECT : Operation of B737 Aircraft Pressurisation System Following the
Accident near the Coastal Town of Grammatikos, Greece

The purpose of this Information Bulletin is to inform all U.A.E. operators operating the B737 aircraft regarding the test protocols and operation of the aircraft pressurisation system as recommended by Boeing.

Following the above accident, Boeing, in coordination with the Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) and the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued a Service Request (SR) ID 1-134333381 providing essential information affecting the test protocols and operation of the aircraft pressurisation system. All concerned operators are therefore required to take note of the following:

- (a) The October 2005 revision to the Flight Crew Training Manual for the respective B737 aircraft which include a new section entitled 'Air Systems/Cabin Altitude Warning'.
- (b) To incorporate the respective revisions to the Aircraft Maintenance Manual on cabin pressure leakage test.

The above mentioned Boeing Service Request is attached for your guidance, information and necessary action.

Best regards,


AHMED AL HADDABI
DIRECTOR AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY



readouts have been completed. The FDR was read out in BEA facilities near Paris and the CVR was read out by the AAIASB. Both recorders have provided useful data.

The AAIASB and NTSB have authorized the release of the following factual investigative information. The subject airplane did not pressurize normally during climb out. The environmental control system packs and bleed switches were configured correctly. The pressure mode selector switch was in MANUAL and pressurization of the aircraft was not automatically controlled, resulting in an increasing cabin altitude as the airplane climbed.

As the airplane cabin altitude passed through 10,000 feet the cabin altitude warning horn sounded in the flight deck and was not cancelled by the crew. The airplane continued to climb and as the cabin altitude passed through approximately 14000 feet, the master caution activated. This activation is believed to be associated with the dropping of the passenger oxygen masks in the main cabin.

The last communication from the flight crew to ground, as indicated by FDR microphone keying, occurred as the airplane was climbing through approximately 29000 feet. The airplane established a cruise altitude of 34000 feet. It remained at this altitude for the next 2 hours and 28 minutes.

The reference (b) message was released to all Model 737 operators on 25 August 2005 to inform them of the upcoming October 2005 revision to 737-300/400/500/600/700/800/900/BBJ Flight Crew Training Manuals (FCTM). This revision will include a new section entitled Air Systems/Cabin Altitude Warning. This section reminds flight crews of the importance of verifying the bleed and pack system configuration after takeoff. Further, it reminds crews how to understand and recognize the differences between cabin altitude and takeoff configuration warnings.

In addition, the AAIASB has recommended that Boeing revise Section 05-51-91 of Reference (c) "Excessive Cabin Pressure Leakage - Maintenance Practices". The primary revision will be to include a specific step to put the pressure mode selector switch in AUTO at the conclusion of the cabin pressure leakage test. These changes were made to the 737-300/400/500 AMM 05-51-91/20 and will be released in the 12 January 2006 revision cycle. A Temporary Revision was released 29 September 2005 for the 737-300/400/500 models. Revisions to the 737-600/700/800/900/BBJ AMM were made and will be provided in the 10 February 2006 revision. A Temporary Revision was made and will be released 18 October 2005 for the 737-600/700/800/900/BBJ. The 737-100/200 AMM was revised and will be provided in the 1 August 2006 revision. A Temporary Revision for the 737-100/200 AMM was made and will be issued 20 October 2005.

Please note that the accident investigation is still in its early stages and the causes have not been determined. The content of

this message was coordinated with the AAIASB and the NTSB.

Boeing recommends that all 737 operators assure that the information contained in reference (a) is reviewed with flight crews. In addition, Boeing recommends that all 737 operators incorporate the AMM revisions discussed above upon receipt. If the investigation shows any specific additional actions are recommended or required, operators will be notified.

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