



EASA

SHK's assessment of the reply to the safety recommendation from EASA

The 19 October 2016 the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (Statens haverikommission - SHK) published the report RL 2016:07 regarding a serious incident with the aircraft SE-MDB. In the report SHK issued a safety recommendation to EASA.

SHK stated that it assessed that additional extensive engineering initiatives were necessary in order to find the cause of the incident and that such initiatives should be the responsibility of the aircraft and propeller type certificate holders, under supervision of the certifying authorities. It was also established that the known incidents of a similar nature had taken place under similar circumstances.

SHK recommended EASA to:

Consider introducing temporary limitations in the manoeuvring envelope, or limitations of the power ranges within the latter, until the problem is resolved and rectified. (RL 2016:07 R1)

EASA responded to the safety recommendation and stated that testing coordinated between aircraft and propeller type certificate holders was still ongoing. These tests are necessary to confirm the possible causes of severe vibrations. EASA classified the recommendation as open. No further response has been received from EASA.

During the investigation, the 30 January 2016, EASA issued a safety information bulletin recommending operators to follow as much as possible the aircraft manufacturer recommendation for a standard descent speed at maximum 240 knots. If, for any reason, during descent the speed becomes close to VMO and the power levers have to be reduced to "flight idle" position, a smooth and progressive reduction of the power levers should be accomplished.


When SHK published the final report the authority was aware of the safety information bulletin but considered it not to be sufficient, which was the reason to recommend EASA to consider temporary limitations in the manoeuvring envelope or limitations of the power ranges within the latter, until the problem is resolved and rectified.

To the best of SHK's knowledge further testing has been performed since then without resolving the problem.

The recommended measures have not been taken and EASA has not elaborated on their initial response.

The initial response of EASA confirms the need of further testing to resolve the root cause of the incident. However, the safety recommendation aimed at mitigating the existing risks until a final solution has been found.

SHK consider that the safety recommendation has not been taken care of and the response issued by EASA can not be considered to be adequate (closed – not adequate response).



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